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CASENOTE
SOERING'S CASE: WAITING FOR
GODOT - CRUEL AND UNUSUAL
PUNISHMENT?
James M. Lenihant
One of the most challenging and controversial topics of
criminal justice in the modern era centers around the death pen-
alty. The allegation that the death penalty is cruel and unusual
punishment 1 has been raised repeatedly in federal courts2 as well
as state courts.3 In addition to extensive litigation, extensive
scholarship has brought the death penalty to the forefront of so-
cial and legal awareness." Authors providing insight or opinion
range from Supreme Court justices5 to law students.'
t J.D. Pace University School of Law, practicing criminal law in White Plains, N.Y.
I Cruel and unusual punishment is:
[S]uch punishment as would amount to torture or barbarity, and any cruel and
degrading punishment not known to the common law, and also any punishment so
disproportionate to the offense as to shock the moral sense of the community. In
re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436. Punishment which is excessive for the crime committed
is cruel and unusual. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584. ... The death penalty is not
per se cruel and unusual punishment within the prohibition of the 8th Amend-
ment, U.S. Const., but states must follow strict safeguards in the sentencing of one
to death. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1234 (6th ed. 1990).
1 As of October 9, 1990, there were 2,454 federal cases recorded in the WESTLAW
database where the death penalty itself or the method of execution was alleged to be
cruel and unusual punishment.
3 This issue has been noted in 676 state cases, according to WESTLAW's database.
' There are currently more than 125 law review articles that discuss this controversy
in varying degrees in the WESTLAW database.
" See, e.g., William J. Brennan, Jr., Constitutional Adjudication and the Death
Penalty: A View from the Court, 100 HARV. L. REV. 313 (Dec. 1986).
' See, e.g., Miranda B. Strassmann, Note, Mills v. Maryland: The Supreme Court
Guarantees The Consideration Of Mitigating Circumstances Pursuant To Lockett v.
Ohio, 38 CATH. U. L. REV. 907 (1989).
1
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The scope of the death penalty controversy is not confined
to the United States.7 Rather, the norms of the entire world re-
garding the death penalty have had an immediate domestic ef-
fect in many nations.' The effect that international norms may
have on the domestic application of the death penalty was
demonstrated recently by the European Court of Human Rights
(the Court) in Soering's Case.9 In this case, the Court refused to
allow the government of Great Britain to extradite Mr. Soering,
a German national, to the United States where he was charged
with capital murder.1"
Although this was not the first time that extradition was re-
fused on grounds that a defendant faced cruel and unusual pun-
ishment, the Court's rationale in Soering was unique. In Soer-
ing, the Court refused to grant extradition, not because the
death penalty was cruel and unusual punishment, but because
Soering would be subjected to "death-row phenomenon." The
Court determined that death row phenomenon, also known as
death row syndrome, was cruel and unusual punishment.1" Be-
cause Mr. Soering would be subjected to "death row phenome-
non," the Court determined that the extradition of Mr. Soering
would violate Article 3 of the Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. 2
Part I of this note provides background information and the
facts of the case. Part II examines the procedural history and
jurisdictional issues in the case, while Part III explains the legal
issues presented to the Court. Part IV of this note discusses the
opinion of the Court with an analysis of that opinion following
in Part V. This note concludes in Part VI, which examines the
ramifications of this decision.
' Joan F. Hartman, 'Unusual Punishment': The Effects of International Norms Re-
tricting The Application of the Death Penalty, 52 U. CIN. L. REV. 655 (1983).
8 Id. at 666, 667 n. 44.
161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1989).
10 Id. at 5.
Id.
' Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 [hereinafter the Convention]. Article 3 of the Con-
vention provides that "[n]o one shall be subjected to torture or to inhumane or degrad-
ing treatment or punishment."
[Vol. 4:157
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I. BACKGROUND AND FACTS OF Soering's Case
On March 30, 1985, William Reginald Haysom and Nancy
Astor Haysom, Canadian nationals, were killed in their Bedford
County, Virginia home."3 Their deaths were the result of massive
and multiple stab wounds to the neck, throat, and body." After
an intensive investigation, suspicion fell on the victims' daugh-
ter, Elizabeth Haysom, a twenty-year-old student at the Univer-
sity of Virginia, and her boyfriend, Jens Soering, an eighteen-
year-old German national also studying at the University of
Virginia.15
In October 1985, the two suspects disappeared from Vir-
ginia. In April 1986, they were arrested in England and charged
with check fraud. During his incarceration in England, Soering
was interviewed by a police investigator from the Bedford
County, Virginia Sheriff's Department. In a sworn affidavit
dated July 24, 1986 the investigator recorded Soering as having
admitted the killings in the presence of two police officers from
the United Kingdom and the Virginia investigators.1 6 Soering
stated that he was in love with Elizabeth Haysom, but that her
parents were opposed to their relationship and therefore, he and
Elizabeth Haysom had planned to kill Elizabeth's parents. 7 He
claimed that he and Elizabeth rented a car in Charlottesville,
Virginia, and drove to Washington, D.C. to establish an alibi.
Soering then drove to the parents' house where the parents and
Soering discussed the relationship. An argument ensued and he
subsequently killed them with a knife."
Soering was indicted on both capital and non-capital mur-
der charges, and a warrant was issued for his arrest. 9 The war-
rant was executed on December 30, 1986, at the Chelmsford
(England) prison, where Soering had just completed serving a
prison sentence for check fraud. Soering faced a possible death
sentence in the United States, however, the death penalty had
" 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1989) at 14.
', Id. at 11.
I Id.
10 Id.
17 Id.
Id.
Id. at 12.
20 Id.
19921
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been abolished in Great Britain.21 Therefore, the British sought
assurances that the death penalty would not be pursued or
would not be carried out.22
During his incarceration, Soering was interviewed by a Ger-
man prosecutor (Staatsanwalt) who, in a sworn witness state-
ment, stated that Soering claimed "he had never had the inten-
tion of killing Mr. and Mrs. Haysom and . . . he could only
remember having inflicted wounds at the neck on Mr. and Mrs.
Haysom which must have had something to do with their dying
later."2 Further, Soering stated that in the days immediately
preceding the stabbings "there had been no talk whatsoever [be-
tween him and Elizabeth Haysom] about killing Elizabeth's par-
ents." 4 Shortly thereafter, the German authorities issued a war-
rant for Soering's arrest and sought his extradition.25
2' The death penalty was abolished in the United Kingdom in 1965 with the passage
of the 1965 Murder Act in November 1965. Murder (Abolition of Death Penalty Act)
1965, c. 71, 13 & 14 Eliz.2 (1965). Prior to the enactment of the Murder Act, the death
penalty could be imposed only for certain crimes specifically delineated by statute. See
Homicide Act, c. 11 5 & 6 Eliz. 2, Part II §§ 5, 6 (1957). According to this act, the death
penalty could only be imposed for certain murders or repeated murders. Section 5 of the
Homicide Act permitted the execution of the death penalty for murders done in the
furtherance of theft; by shooting or explosion; for the purpose of resisting a lawful arrest
or escape from custody; for the murder of any police officer; or for the murder of any
prison officer. Homicide Act, c.11, Part II §5. Where a person was convicted of a previous
murder, he would be subject to the death penalty under section 6 of this statute.
22 The terms of the request as cited by the court were:
Because the death penalty has been abolished in Great Britain, the Embassy has
been instructed to seek an assurance, in accordance with the terms of . . . the
Extradition Treaty, that, in the event of Mr. Soering being surrendered and being
convicted of the crimes for which he has been indicted . . . the death penalty, if
imposed, will not be carried out.
Should it not be possible on constitutional grounds for the United States to
give such assurance, the United Kingdom authorities ask that the United States
Government undertake to recommend to the appropriate authorities that the
death penalty should not be imposed or, if imposed, should not be executed.
161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1989) at 12.
23 Id.
24 Id.
2' German Criminal Law applies to an act committed abroad by a German national
if the act is subject to punishment under the law of the place where the offense was
committed. See Strafgesetzbuch (StGB) § 7(2).
StGB § 211(2) defines murder:
He is deemed a murderer who because of murderous lust, to satisfy his sexual
instinct, for reasons of covetousness or for otherwise base motives, insidiously or
cruelly or by means constituting a public danger or in order to render another
crime possible or to conceal another crime kills a person.
4https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol4/iss1/7
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Pursuant to an Extradition Treaty,2 8 Elizabeth Haysom was
returned to the United States in May 1987. The following Au-
gust she pled guilty as an accessory to the murder of her parents
and was sentenced to two forty-five-year prison terms.2 In June
1987, the attorney general for Bedford County, Virginia signed a
sworn affidavit certifying that at Soering's trial a representation
would be made in the name of the United Kingdom that the
United Kingdom government did not wish the death sentence to
be imposed or carried out.2 '8 During the following months, the
Virginia authorities informed the United Kingdom government
that Virginia would not assure the death penalty would not be
imposed. In fact, Mr. Updike, the attorney for Bedford County,
fully intended to seek the death penalty in the case.2 9
A psychiatric examination was conducted on Soering's be-
half while awaiting a decision on the extradition order. The re-
sults indicated that Soering was suffering from mental abnor-
malities that, in the United Kingdom, would constitute a
defense to the murder charges.30 The psychiatrist concluded that
Murder is punishable by life imprisonment. StGB § 211(1).
" Extradition Treaty Between The Government Of The United States of America
And The Government Of The United Kingdom Of Great Britain and Northern Ireland,
June 8, 1972, U.S.-U.K., 28 U.S.T. 227 (1972) [hereinafter Extradition Treaty].
27 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 13 (1989).
28 Id. The text of the affidavit provides in pertinent part:
I hereby certify that should Jens Soering be convicted of the offense of capital
murder as charged in Bedford County, Virginia ... a representation will be made
in the name of the United Kingdom to the judge at the time of sentencing that it
is the wish of the United Kingdom that the death penalty should not be imposed
or carried out.
Id.
29 Id. at 13-14.
20 Specifically, the report provided by forensic psychiatrist Dr. Henrietta Bullard
states:
There existed between Miss Haysom and Soering a "folie & deux" in which the
most disturbed partner was Miss Hayson....
At the time of the offence, it is my opinion that Jens Soering was suffering
from [such] an abnormality of mind due to inherent causes as substantially im-
paired his mental responsibility for his acts. The psychiatric syndrome referred to
as "folie 6 deux" is a well-recognized state of mind where one partner is suggesti-
ble to the extent that he or she believes in the psychotic delusions of the other.
The degree of disturbance of Miss Haysom borders on the psychotic, and, over the
course of many months, she was able to persuade Soering that he might have to
kill her parents for her and him to survive as a couple.... Miss Haysom had a
stupefying and mesmeric effect on Soering which led to an abnormal psychological
state in which he became unable to think rationally or question the absurdities in
5
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Soering was "immature and inexperienced and had lost his per-
sonal identity in a symbiotic relationship with his girlfriend - a
powerful, persuasive and disturbed young woman."31 Soering
was transferred to a prison hospital and treated as a suicide-risk
prisoner until November 1988. A subsequent psychiatric evalua-
tion disclosed Soering's dread of extreme physical violence and
potential homosexual attack from the death row inmates in Vir-
ginia.32 The psychiatrist's report also indicated that Soering ex-
hibited a mounting desperation and posited that he might still
try to take his own life. 3
Notwithstanding these findings, the Chief Magistrate com-
mitted Soering to await the Secretary of State's order directing
his extradition to the United States.34 After numerous petitions
to the United Kingdom, Soering, seeking to defeat his extradi-
tion to the United States, made an application to the European
Commission of Human Rights (the Commission) under Article
25 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms (Convention).3 5 In his application, Soer-
ing alleged that the Secretary of State's decision to surrender
him to the United States would cause the United Kingdom to
breach Article 3 of the Convention 6 by exposing him to "death
Miss Haysom's view of her life and the influence of her parents....
In conclusion, it is my opinion that, at the time of the offenses Soering was
suffering from an abnormality of mind which, in this country would constitute a
defence of "not guilty to murder but guilty of manslaughter."
Id. at 14.
These conclusions were equivalent to the conclusions drawn by an earlier report by
Dr. John Hamilton, which were not offered into evidence.
31 Id.
"I Id.
33 Id.
4 Id.
" Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 [hereinafter the Convention]. Article 25 provides:
The commission may receive petitions addressed to the Secretary-General of the
Council of Europe from any person, non-governmental organization or group of
individuals claiming to be the victim of a violation by one of the High Contracting
Parties of the rights set forth in this Convention, provided that the High Con-
tracting Party against which the complaint has been lodged has declared that it
recognizes the competence of the Commission to receive such petitions. Those of
the High Contracting Parties who have made such a declaration undertake not to
hinder in any way the effective exercise of this right.
ld.
6 Id., art. 3. "No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhumane or degrading
treatment or punishment." Id.
[Vol. 4:157
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row phenomenon. ' 37 Soering also alleged that because of the
"absence of legal aid in Virginia to fund collateral challenges
before the Federal courts . . . he would not be able to secure his
legal representation as required by the Convention. '3 8 In addi-
tion to these allegations, Soering claimed defect in the extradi-
tion proceedings in England 9 and alleged that he had no rem-
edy available to him in the United Kingdom.40 The President of
the Commission recommended that Soering's extradition be
stayed during the proceedings before the Commission and the
Court. The government of the United Kingdom accepted that
recommendation and recommitted Soering to the prison hospital
pending these proceedings.4 '
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND JURISDICTIONAL ISSUES
A. Procedural History
Two weeks after his committal by the Chief Magistrate on
June 16, 1987, Soering applied for a writ of habeas corpus as to
the committal and for leave to apply for judicial review. Both of
these requests were denied by the Divisional Court in December
1987.42 In June 1988, Soering's petition to the House of Lords,
appealing the Divisional Court's decision, was also rejected.
On July 8, 1988, Soering filed an application with the Euro-
pean Commission on Human Rights under Article 25 of the Con-
vention. Soering also petitioned the Secretary of State to exer-
cise his discretionary power not to order Soering's surrender to
" 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 32 (1989). "This phenomenon may be described as
consisting in a combination of circumstances to which [Soering] would be exposed if,
after having been extradited to Virginia to face a capital murder charge, he were sen-
tenced to death." Id.
8 The Convention, supra note 31, Art. 6 § 3(c) provides, in pertinent part: "Every-
one charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights:
(c)... to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or,
if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the
interests of justice so require ......
" 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 46; see also, infra notes 62-69 and accompanying
text.
40 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 46.
1 Id. at 9.
42 Id. at 14-15.
19921
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the United States,4 3 but the petition was rejected. On August 3,
1988, the Secretary of State signed a warrant ordering Soering's
surrender to the United States.4 4 On August 11, 1988, the Com-
mission's President indicated that it preferred not to extradite
Soering to the United States until the Commission had an op-
portunity to examine Soering's petition. 5 The Commission ad-
mitted Soering's petition on November 10, 1988 and issued its
findings on January 19, 1989.
Subsequent to that decision, this case was brought before
the European Court of Human Rights by the Commission on
January 25, 1989, by the United Kingdom on January 30, 1989,
and by the Federal Republic of Germany on February 3, 1989.46
B. Jurisdictional Issues
One of the difficulties faced by the United Kingdom was de-
ciding whether the United States or the Federal Republic of
Germany was entitled to the extradition of the defendant. Eng-
lish courts do not exercise jurisdiction over cases involving the
acts of foreigners abroad, except under circumstances not ame-
nable to this case. Therefore, neither Soering, a German na-
tional, nor Haysom, a Canadian national, was subject to the ju-
risdiction of the criminal courts in the United Kingdom.' 7 On
August 11, 1986, the United States requested the extradition of
both Haysom and Soering pursuant to the terms of the Extradi-
tion Treaty of 1972.' 8 On March 11, 1987, the Federal Republic
of Germany requested Soering's extradition pursuant to the Ex-
"' Id. at 15.
14 Id. It is critical to understand these events sequentially. Note that the application
to the Commission on July 8, 1988, the petition to the Secretary of State, and the appli-
cation for judicial review were all commenced prior to August 3, 1988, when the Secre-
tary of State actually signed the warrant.
41 Id. at 31.
, Id. at 9, 31.
Id. at 16.
, Extradition Treaty, supra note 26, art. 1. This treaty provides that:
[E]ach Contracting Party undertakes to extradite to the other, in the circum-
stances and subject to the conditions specified in this Treaty, any person found in
its territory who has been accused or convicted of any offence within Article III [of
which murder is one], committed within the jurisdiction of the other Party.
Id. at 229.
[Vol. 4:157
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tradition Treaty of 1872."' In the United Kingdom, extradition
hearings are conducted before a magistrate, who must be con-
vinced that there is enough evidence to put the accused on
trial."0 Therefore, a prima facie case must be established before
the magistrate will issue a commitment order.5'
1. Extradition Requested by the Federal Republic of Germany
The United Kingdom refused to extradite Soering to the
Federal Republic of Germany, claiming that the conditions set
forth in the 1870 Extradition Act were not met 2 The United
Kingdom determined that the evidence submitted in support of
the case, brought against Soering by the German prosecutor,
consisted solely of the defendant's statements made to that
prosecutor in the absence of a caution.5 3 Although the United
Kingdom conceded that the German courts had jurisdiction to
try the defendant, the evidence produced "did not amount to a
prima facie case against him . . . . 5 Due to this failure, the
Magistrate "would not be able to commit Soering to await extra-
dition to Germany on the strength of admissions obtained in
such circumstances.
55
2. Extradition Requested by the United States
The United States requested Soering's extradition claiming
that there was no means of compelling witnesses from the
United States to appear in a criminal court in Germany. 56 The
United States government also explained its understanding that
Germany could not try the case on the basis of Soering's admis-
sions alone. 7 On May 20, 1987 the United Kingdom informed
" Treaty Between Germany and Great Britain For The Mutual Surrender of Fugi-
tive Criminals, May 14, 1872, Ger.-Gr.Br., 144 Consol. T.S. 369.
5 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 17. "A magistrate must be satisfied that there is
sufficient evidence to put the accused on trial; before committing him a prima facie case
must be made out against him." Id.
I1 /d.
6' Id. at 12-13.
8 Id. at 12.
Id. at 13.
" Id.
8' Id.
7 Id.
1992]
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Germany that "the United States had earlier 'submitted a re-
quest, supported by prima facie evidence, for the extradition of
Mr. Soering'."' 8 The United Kingdom authorities indicated that
they sought assurances from the United States as to the non-
imposition of the death penalty, and stated that "in the event
that the court commits Mr. Soering, his surrender to the United
States authorities would be subject to the receipt of satisfactory
assurances on this matter."5 9 Article IV of the United Kingdom-
United States Extradition Treaty"0 provides:
If the offence for which extradition is requested is punishable by
death under the relevant law of the requesting Party, but the rel-
evant law of the requested Party does not provide for the death
penalty in a similar case, extradition may be refused unless the
requesting Party gives assurances satisfactory to the requested
Party that the death penalty will not be carried out.6
Where a fugitive requested by the United States faces the
possibility of receiving the death penalty, the Secretary of State
for the United Kingdom has established the practice of ac-
cepting the assurance from the prosecutors that "a representa-
tion will be made to the judge at the time of sentencing that it is
the wish of the United Kingdom that the death penalty should
be neither imposed nor carried out."62 The mutual understand-
ing as to the effect of these assurances was described by the
Minister of State at the Home Office:
The written undertakings about the death penalty that the Secre-
tary of State obtains from the Federal authorities amount to an
undertaking that the views of the United Kingdom will be repre-
sented to the judge. At the time of sentencing he will be informed.
that the United Kingdom does not wish the death penalty to be
imposed or carried out. That means that the United Kingdom au-
thorities render up a fugitive or are prepared to send a citizen to
face an American court on the clear understanding that the death
penalty will not be carried out - it has never been carried out in
such cases. It would be a fundamental blow to the extradition
agreements between our two countries if the death penalty were
fi Id.
I9 !d.
6' Extradition Treaty, supra note 22.
Id., art. IV.
161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 19.
[Vol. 4:157
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carried out on an individual who had been returned under those
circumstance."3
The standing practice of the Secretary of State has met with
cooperation previously, yet no cases actually challenged the ef-
fectiveness of the process before the Soering case. Hence, the
argument was brought by Soering that there were no "assur-
ances" given that would preclude the death sentence.6
III. LEGAL ISSUES
The allegations brought to the Court by Soering alleged nu-
merous violations of the Convention."5 Specifically, Soering al-
leged violations of: (1) Article 3,66 claiming that the decision of
the Secretary of State for the Home Department to surrender
him to the United States would subject him to cruel and un-
usual punishment;"7 (2) Article 6 § 3(c),68 claiming that because
of "the absence of legal aid in Virginia to fund collateral chal-
lenges before the Federal courts . . . he would not be able to
secure his legal representation;"69 (3) Article 6, §§ 1 and 3(d),
claiming that during the extradition proceedings the English
magistrate refused to consider evidence of Soering's psychiatric
condition; 0 (4) Article 13,11 claiming "no effective remedy in the
63 Id. at 19, quoting Hansard, 10 March 1987, col. 955.
Id. at 30.
e The Convention, supra note 31.
06 "No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhumane or degrading treatment or
punishment." Id., art. 3.
17 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 32.
" The Convention, supra note 31, art. 6 § 3(c).
6" 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 45, quoting article 6 § 3(c) of the Convention. See,
supra note 34.
70 The Convention, supra note 31, at Article 6 §§ 1 and 3(d) respectively provide:
1. In the determination . . . of any criminal charge against him, everyone is enti-
tled to a fair . . . hearing ....
3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights:
(d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain
the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same
conditions as witnesses against him.
Id.
7 Id. art. 13. "Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this Convention
are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding
that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity." Id.
1992]
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United Kingdom existed in respect of his complaint under Arti-
cle 3.' "12
A. The Article Three Violation
Soering charged that the decision to surrender him to the
United States would constitute a violation of Article 3 of the
Convention because he would be exposed to the "death row phe-
nomenon."7' He contended that Article 3 not only prohibited
Contracting States from causing inhumane or degrading treat-
ment or punishment within its own jurisdiction, but also re-
quired them to prevent persons from being exposed to such
treatment at the hands of other States.74 Soering charged that
"an individual may not be surrendered out of the protective
zone of the Convention without certainty that the safeguards" of
the Convention would be afforded to him upon that surrender.7
The European Human Rights Commission agreed with
Soering. The Commission maintained that a person's deporta-
tion or extradition may give rise to an issue under Article 3 of
the Convention where there are serious reasons to believe that
an individual will be subjected, in the receiving State, to treat-
ment contrary to that Article.7
Although the Federal Republic of Germany agreed with the
Commission in its interpretation, the United Kingdom did not.
The United Kingdom argued that Article 3 only applies to acts
committed within the jurisdiction of a Contracting State, and
that liability does not attach to cases involving extradition. 77
Specifically, the United Kingdom maintained that "it would be
straining the language of Article 3 intolerably to hold that by
surrendering a fugitive criminal the extraditing State has 'sub-
jected' him to any treatment or punishment that he will receive
following conviction and sentence in the receiving State. '17 The
"' 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 46.
13 Id. at 46.
" Id. at 32.
76 Id.
76 Id.
77 Id.
78 Id. The United Kingdom also suggested that the approach taken by the
Commission:
[Ilnterferes with international treaty rights, leads to a conflict with norms of in-
[Vol. 4:157
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United Kingdom also charged that implementation of this prin-
ciple would create "a serious risk of harm in the Contracting
State which is obliged to harbor the protected person, and leaves
criminals untried, at large and unpunished. 7 9 As an alternative,
the United Kingdom suggested limiting extradition restrictions
under Article 3 to those cases in which the treatment or punish-
ment is certain, imminent and serious.80
B. Violation of Articles Six and Thirteen
In his application filed with the Commission, Soering al-
leged that the United Kingdom violated Article 6, Section 3(c)
of the Convention by agreeing to surrender him to the United
States."' Soering claimed that the abscence of legal aid in Vir-
ginia to fund collateral challenges in federal court deprived him
of the legal representation ensured under Article 6 of the Con-
vention.8 2 No other party to this action, including the Commis-
sion, found this argument persuasive.
Soering further alleged that during the extradition proceed-
ings the testimony of psychiatric witnesses on his behalf was not
considered. He contended that this violated Article 6, Sections 1
and 3(d). s
Finally, Soering alleged that because he had no effective
remedy as to the Article 3 claim, his rights were violated under
Article 13 of the Convention. As a result of this deficiency, he
faced the possibility of the death penalty and would likely be
subjected to "death row syndrome. '8 4
Soering argued that the Secretary of State is not "suffi-
ternational judicial process because it involves adjudication on internal affairs of
States not Parties to the Convention, entails difficulty of evaluation and proof by
requiring examination of alien systems of law, and the practice of national courts
and the international community cannot be expected to support it.
Id.
" Id. at 33.
Id. "In [the United Kingdom's] view, the fact that by definition the matters com-
plained of are only anticipated, together with the common and legitimate interest of all
States in bringing fugitive criminals to justice, requires a very high degree of risk, proved
beyond reasonable doubt, that ill-treatment will actually occur." Id.
Id. at 45.
92 Id. at 25, 31.
Id. at 46.
Id. at 69.
1992]
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ciently independent and impartial to constitute an effective rem-
edy" 85 and that judicial review of the Secretary's decision is lim-
ited to whether the Secretary acted reasonably. 6 Both Soering
and the Commission asserted that this scope of judicial review
was too narrow to consider the subject matter of the com-
plaint. 7 Further, they alleged that even if the Court was able to
review the decision of the Secretary of State, the Court's "lack
of jurisdiction to issue injunctions against the Crown ...
render[ed] judicial review an ineffective remedy." '88 Hence, in
Soering's view, whether the Secretary's decision was in conform-
ity with the Convention remained unanswered. 9
In response, the United Kingdom contended that Article 13
was inapplicable because the applicant's complaint was not "ar-
guable." It further suggested that Article 13 had no application
to potential violations of the Convention, since it would create
difficulties in anticipating the nature and likelihood of a breach,
as well as the nature of the remedy to be granted."
IV. OPINION OF THE COURT
While the allegations brought under Articles 6 and 13 were
fairly straightforward, the legal issues pertaining to the Article 3
claim were complex. In order to adequately address this allega-
tion, the Court broke the charge down into two issues:
(1)"Whether the applicant runs a real risk of a death sentence
and hence of exposure to the 'death row phenomenon' -;91 and
(2)"Whether in the circumstances the risk of exposure to the
'death row phenomenon' would make extradition a breach of Ar-
ticle 3.192
Because of the complexity of the Article 3 issue and because
the thrust of this inquiry pertains to Article 3, the discussion of
the Court's decision as to Articles 6 and 13 will be addressed in
brief, first.
85 Id.
SO Id.
8 Id. at 47.
I8 d.
89 Id.
90 Id.
o' Id. at 36.
Id. at 39.
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A. The Article Six Violations
Soering's Article 6 claim, that the absence of legal aid in
Virginia to fund collateral challenges before the federal courts,
was rejected by the Court. The Court determined that an extra-
dition decision could generate an issue under Article 6, but that
the attendant circumstances would have had to indicate that the
applicant actually suffered or risked suffering a flagrant denial
of a fair trial in the requesting country. The Court held that the
facts in this case did not present such a risk and, accordingly,
found that Article 6 Section 3(c) was not violated.93
The second alleged violation of Article 6 was disposed of on
a jurisdictional basis. The Court determined that Soering's alle-
gation that the extradition proceeding failed to consider psychi-
atric evidence was not timely presented before the Commission.
Therefore, the Court considered these charges to be outside the
compass of the case and not within the Court's jurisdiction.9 4
B. The Article Thirteen Violations
The Commission agreed with Soering's allegation that there
was no available remedy in the United Kingdom with respect to
his Article 13 claims. The Court determined that the extradition
proceedings required by the Extradition Act of 1870, provided
an effective remedy in relation to the Article 13 complaint. The
Court's decision emphasized that the application for judicial re-
"' Id. at 45. The Court ruled:
The Court does not exclude that an issue might exceptionally be raised under
Article 6 by an extradition decision in circumstances where the fugitive has suf-
fered or risks suffering a flagrant denial of a fair trial in the requesting country.
However, the facts of the present case do not disclose such a risk.
Id.
", Id. at 46. Specifically, the Court said:
Such claims as the applicant then made of a failure to take proper account of the
psychiatric evidence were in relation to Article 3 and limited to the Secretary of
State's ultimate decision to extradite him to the United States. He did not formu-
late any grievances, whether under Article 6, Article 3 or Article 13, regarding the
scope or conduct of the Magistrate's Court proceedings as such. This being so, the
new allegations of a breach of Article 6 constitutes not merely a further legal sub-
mission or argument but a fresh and separate complaint falling outside the com-
pass of the case, which is delimited by the Commission's decision on admissibility
1992]
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view and the writ of habeas corpus failed only for procedural
reasons.9 5 The Court identified the untimeliness of the applica-
tion as the crucial factor in the unfavorable response to the ap-
plications.96 Further, the Court suggested that the application
for habeas corpus, regarding the issue of irrationality, failed be-
cause judicial review was limited to the reasonableness of the
Secretary of State's decision based upon the lack of assurance
received from the United States.9
The Court went so far as to chide Soering for his untimely
application for judicial review.9 8 Although the Court would not
speculate as to what the decision of the English courts would
have been, it did posit that the judicial review issue would have
received earnest attention.99
C. The Article Three Violations: The Applicability of Article
3 in Extradition Cases
The Court began its Article 3 inquiry by posing the follow-
ing question: "[W]hether Article 3 can be applicable when the
adverse consequences of extradition are, or may be, suffered
outside the jurisdiction of the extraditing State as a result of
treatment or punishment administered in the receiving
State."'00 The Court determined that while there is no right
preventing extradition under the Convention,'0 ' where extradi-
" Id. at 48. "However, as Lord Justice Lloyd explained, the claim failed because it
was premature, the courts only having jurisdiction once the Minister has actually taken
his decision." Id.
96 Id.
97 Id.
" Id. "There was nothing to have stopped Mr. Soering bringing an application for
judicial review at the appropriate moment and arguing 'Wednesbury unreasonableness'
on the basis of much the same material that he adduced before the Convention institu-
tions in relation to the 'death row phenomenon'." Id.
The Court is referring to Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury
Corp, 1 K.B. 223 (1948) wherein the court announced a standard of judicial review for
whether a local administrative authority or tribunal has acted unreasonably in whether
the local authority has taken into account any matters that ought not to be considered or
disregarded any matters that should have been considered.
99 Id. "Such a claim would have been given 'the most anxious scrutiny' in view of
the fundamental nature of the human right at stake." Id.
Id. at 33.
o, The Convention, supra note 31, art. 5 § 1(f) provides for the "lawful arrest or
detention of a person . . . against whom action is being taken with a view to deportation
or extradition."
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tion has consequences adversely affecting a Convention right,
the extradition may attract the obligations of a Contracting
State under the guarantees of the Convention. °'
The Court interpreted Article 1103 as setting the Conven-
tion's territorial limit,10" and determined that this Article did
not justify the refusal to extradite a fugitive based on the lack of
assurance by the requesting State that the Convention's safe-
guards would be complied with.'0 5 The Court also reiterated the
United Kingdom's position that the purpose of extradition was
to prevent fugitive offenders from evading justice. The Court
recognized that there are specific instruments which directly ad-
dress the problems of removing a person to a jurisdiction where
unwanted consequences may follow.' 0 6 Notwithstanding these
considerations, the Court held that contracting parties to the
Convention were still responsible, under Article 3, for any and
all foreseeable consequences of extradition suffered outside their
jurisdiction. 17 Therefore, the Court ruled, a decision by a con-
tracting State to extradite a fugitive may give rise to an Article 3
issue where there are substantial grounds to believe that, if ex-
tradited, the fugitive faces a real risk of being subjected to tor-
ture or inhuman or degrading treatment at the hands of the au-
thorities in the requesting country.'
The Court admitted that it needed to assess the potential
treatment of the fugitive in the requesting country against the
standards established by Article 3.109 The Court emphasized,
1 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 33.
103 "The High Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone within their jurisdiction
the rights and freedoms defined in Section 1 of this Convention."
104 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 33. "In particular, the engagement undertaken by a
Contracting State is confined to 'securing'. .. the listed rights and freedoms to persons
within its own 'jurisdiction'." Id.
105 Id.
10 Id. at 34.
107 Id.
00 Id. at 35. The Court specifically held:
[T]he decision by a Contracting State to extradite a fugitive may give rise to an
issue under Article 3, and hence engage the responsibility of that State under the
Convention, where substantial grounds have been shown for believing that the
person concerned, if extradited, faces a real risk of being subjected to torture or
inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment in the requesting country.
109 Id. at 36.
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however, that the extraditing State may incur liability due to
action which exposes the individual to proscribed treatment.11
"Extradition in such circumstances, while not explicitly referred
to in the brief and general wording of Article 3, would plainly be
contrary to the spirit and intendment of the Article . . .,.
Therefore, the Court concluded, an "inherent obligation not to
extradite also extends to cases in which the fugitive would be
faced in the receiving State by a real risk of exposure to inhu-
man or degrading treatment or punishment proscribed by that
Article."" 2
IV. ANALYSIS'"
A. The Decision of The Court as to Article Thirteen
The Court ruledthat there was no violation of Article 13 in
the Soering case, and emphasized that Article 13 guarantees the
availability of a remedy at the national level to enforce substan-
tive rights and freedoms protected by the Convention." 4 The ef-
fectiveness of the remedy was not, however, dependant upon the
certainty of a favorable outcome." 5 The effect of this Article, it
explained, "is thus to require the provision of a domestic remedy
allowing the competent 'national authority' both to deal with the
substance of the relevant Convention complaint and to grant ap-
propriate relief .. nia
In finding that there was no violation of Article 13, the
Court explained in great depth the extradition procedure pursu-
ant to the Extradition Act of 1870." The Court stated:
Il Id. at 36. "In so far as any liability under the Convention is or may be incurred,
it is liability incurred by the extraditing Contracting State by reason of its having taken
action which has as a direct consequence the exposure of an individual to proscribed ill-
treatment." Id.
... Id. at 35.
112 Id.
13 Due to the nature of the claims under Article 6, the brevity of their treatment by
the Court, and the decision of the Court in respect to their disposition, these issues will
not be discussed in this section. For the discussion of these issues, see supra notes 73-74
and accompanying text.
.. 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 47.
Id. at 48.
"' Id. at 47.
... Extradition Act, 1870, 33 & 34 Vict. (1870).
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Extradition proceedings in the United Kingdom consist in an ex-
tradition hearing before a magistrate. Section 10 of the Extradi-
tion Act 1870 provides that if "such evidence is produced as (sub-
ject to the provisions of this Act) would, according to the law of
England, justify the committal for trial of the prisoner if the
crime of which he is accused had been committed in England...
the . ..magistrate shall commit him to prison but otherwise he
shall order him to be discharged". A magistrate must be satisfied
that there is sufficient evidence to put the accused on trial; before
committing him a prima facie case must be made out against him.
"The test is whether, if the evidence before the Magistrate stood
alone at the trial, a reasonable jury properly directed could accept
it and find a verdict of guilty" (Schtracks v. Government of Israel
[1964] Appeal Cases 556).118
This Act also provides that decisions in extradition proceed-
ings may be challenged by application for a writ of habeas
corpus." 9 A habeas corpus application is made to the Divisional
Court and, upon leave, to the House of Lords. The principal
concerns of Habeas corpus proceedings are whether: (1) the
Magistrate had jurisdiction to hear the case; (2) there was
enough evidence before him to justify committal; (3) the offense
was not political; and, (4) there was no bar on other grounds to
surrender. 20
In addition, the Act provides that every prisoner who has
exhausted his habeas corpus remedies may petition the Secre-
tary of State to override the court decision to surrender him. 2'
Additionally, the Secretary of State's decision to reject a pris-
oner's petition and to sign the surrender warrant is subject to
judicial review. 22
As to Soering's claim in particular, the Court determined
that the extradition proceedings required by the Extradition Act
of 1870 provided an effective remedy in relation to the Article 3
complaint.'23 In deciding this, the Court emphasized that this
particular application for judicial review and writ of habeas
"1 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 17.
119 Id.
120 Id.
... Id. at 18.
122 Id.
.23 Id. at 17 and 47 referring to the availability of judicial review under the Extradi-
tion Act of 1870; see supra note 114.
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corpus failed only for procedural reasons. The Court held:
[T]he claim failed because it was premature, the courts only hav-
ing jurisdiction once the Minister has actually taken his decision
...There was nothing to have stopped Mr. Soering [from] bring-
ing an application for judicial review at the appropriate moment
and arguing "Wednesbury unreasonableness"' 12 4 on the basis of
much the same material that he adduced before the Convention
institutions in relation to the "death row phenomenon". Such a
claim would have been given "the most anxious scrutiny" in view
of the fundamental nature of the human right at stake." 5
The Court agreed that an English court would have had jurisdic-
tion to quash the decision to extradite where it was established
that there was a "serious risk of inhuman or degrading treat-
ment, on the ground that in all the circumstances of the case the
decision was one which no reasonable Secretary of State could
take [sic]."' 26
Finally, the Court addressed the allegation that the English
courts lacked jurisdiction to grant an interim injunction against
the Crown. The Court determined that this did not detract from
the effectiveness of judicial review because there was no sugges-
tion that Soering would be surrendered before his application
and appeal had been finally determined.
1 27
B. The Article Three Violations
The Court characterized the Convention as a treaty for the
collective enforcement of human rights and fundamental free-
doms. As such, it determined that any interpretation of those
rights and freedoms which it guaranteed had to be consistent
with "the general spirit of the Convention, an instrument
designed to maintain and promote the ideals and values of a
democratic society.' 2 8 The Court suggested that it would be in-
compatible with the principles of the Convention to allow a
M" The Court is referring to Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednes-
bury Corp., 1 K.B. 223 (1948), where the court held that the test in an extradition case is
that no reasonable Secretary of State could have made an order for the return in the
circumstances.
... 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 48.
120 Id. at 18.
Id. at 48.
121 Id. at 34.
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"Contracting State [to] knowingly . . . surrender a fugitive to
another State where there were substantial grounds for believing
that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture, how-
ever heinous the crime allegedly committed."1 "
Having established that the principles of the Convention
apply to extradition cases, the Court directed its attention to the
question of whether the foreseeable consequences of Soering's
return to the United States were applicable to Article 3.30 To
determine this, the Court decided that the first point of inquiry
must be whether "Soering runs a real risk of being sentenced to
death in Virginia, since the source of the alleged inhuman and
degrading treatment or punishment, namely the 'death row phe-
nomenon', lies in the imposition of the death penalty.' 31 The
Court maintained that only in the event of an affirmative answer
to this question, was it necessary to examine whether exposure
to "death row phenomenon" in Soering's case would involve
treatment or punishment incompatible with Article 3.132
1. The Risk Of A Death Sentence
The Court considered many factors in evaluating whether
Soering actually risked receiving the death penalty. The United
Kingdom Government maintained that the real risk was insuffi-
cient to invoke Article 3, and stated numerous factors to support
its contention. Soering's denial of the intent to kill the Haysoms,
as told to the German prosecutor, placed his actual intent in
question. The burden of proving that intent was placed upon the
American prosecutor.' 3 3 In addition, only a prima facie case was
made out during the extradition proceedings. Issues regarding
Soering's mental capacity and the possibility of an insanity de-
fense under Virginia law34 were also relevant. The evidence de-
"9 Id. at 35.
1"0 Id. at 36.
131 Id.
132 Id.
... Id. This is significant because the American investigator's evidence of Soering's
admitted intent would have virtually eliminated this burden.
"' Id. at 22-23. Although Virginia generally does not recognize the defense of dimin-
ished capacity (Stamper v. Commonwealth, 324 S.E.2d 682 (1985)), a plea of insanity at
the time of the offense is a defense which, if successful, bars conviction. This will apply
in cases where the defendant knows that the act is wrong, but is driven by a mental
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rived from Soering's mental examinations would have been im-
portant as a mitigating factor 135 in the sentencing stage of trial
to show that the defendant suffered from extreme mental or
emotional disturbance, or that at the time of the offense his abil-
ity to understand the nature of his conduct was significantly im-
paired.136 Additionally, Soering's age, prior record, or the lack
thereof, and mental condition would all have been considered by
a jury even if Soering was convicted. Finally, the United King-
dom proposed that "the assurance received from the United
States must at the very least significantly reduce the risk of cap-
ital sentence either being imposed or carried out. 137
Soering argued the contrary position, that there were argu-
ments supporting not only the possibility but the probability of
Soering's death sentence. The principle argument was that the
relations between the United States and the United Kingdom
pertaining to extradition were conducted by federal and not
state authorities." 8 The federal authorities have no power to
give assurances regarding the death penalty, where the offense is
a state and not a federal violation.139 If the State does give as-
surances, however, the Government of the United States is em-
powered to ensure that the State's promise is honored.140 The
only enforceable assurance given by the Virginia authorities was
disease, affecting the volition, to commit the offense (See, e.g., Thompson v. Common-
wealth, 70 S.E.2d 284 (1952), Godley v. Commonwealth, 2 Va. App. 249 (1986)), or where
the defendant does not understand the nature, character and consequence of his act or
cannot distinguish right from wrong (Price v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 564, 323 S.E.2d
106 (1984)).
" Id. at 21. Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264.4B (Michie 1990) delineates mitigating fac-
tors including, but not limited to:
(i) the defendant has no significant history of prior criminal activity, (ii) the capi-
tal felony was committed while the defendant was under the influence of extreme
mental or emotional disturbance, (iii) the victim was a participant in the defend-
ant's conduct or consented to the act, (iv) at the time of the commission of the
capital felony, the capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his
conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was significantly
impaired, (v) the age of the defendant at the time of the commission of the capital
offense, or (vi) mental retardation of the defendant.
Id.
136 Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264.3:1 (Michie 1990).
131 Soering's Case, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 37 (1989).
'18 Id. at 28.
139 Id.
140 Id-
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that "a representation [would] be made in the name of the
United Kingdom to the judge at the time of sentencing that it is
the wish of the United Kingdom that the death penalty should
not be imposed or carried out. ' 141 This assurance was dimin-
ished by the public announcement that the District Attorney
was actively seeking the death penalty, 4 ' and the Attorney Gen-
eral's statement that "if Mr. Soering were extradited to the
United States there was 'some risk', which was 'more than
merely negligible', that the death penalty would be imposed."'
14 3
Finally, the Court examined the crime itself, recognizing
that under Virginia law, a death sentence can only be imposed
where the prosecution proves, beyond a reasonable doubt, the
existence of at least one of the statutory aggravating circum-
stances,4 for example, future dangerousness"5 or vileness."46
Although there was no reason to suspect that a Virginia court
would find that Soering presented a serious and continuing
threat to the community, the Court was concerned with the
"vileness" test. It referred to a similar Virginia case, Edmonds v.
Commonwealth,147 where proof of multiple stab wounds sus-
tained by the victim, particularly a neck wound, which even con-
sidered alone, constituted an aggravated battery in the light of
the savage, methodical manner in which it was inflicted, leaving
the victim to suffer an interval of agony awaiting death, has
been held to satisfy the test of 'vileness' under this section." 8
In considering Soering's case, the Court found "the horrible
and brutal circumstances of the killing would presumably tell
against the applicant, regard being had to the case-law on the
grounds for establishing the vileness of the crime."""
,.. Id. at 13.
"I Id. at 14.
113 Id. at 37.
.. 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 37 (1989).
1' See Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264.2 (Michie 1990). This aggravating circumstance
exists where there is a probability that the defendant will commit criminal acts of vio-
lence that would constitute a continuing and serious threat to society.
140 Id. Vileness exists when the crime was "outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or
inhumane in that it involved torture, depravity of mind or an aggravated battery to the
victim." Id.
17 329 S.E.2d 807, 814, cert. denied, 474 U.S. 975 (1985).
"' 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 21 (1989).
"' Id. at 37.
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The Court determined that the likelihood of Soering's expo-
sure to the "death row phenomenon" was sufficient to invoke
Article 3 of the Convention.6 0 In its decision, the Court gave
great weight to the arguments that the charge was a state and
not a federal offense and that there was no way to ensure that
the death sentence would not be given.1'51 The Court gave this
reliance because it determined that the representations made by
the District Attorney did not eliminate the risk of the death
penalty being imposed, especially in the light of the attorney's
remarks, that he "decided to seek and to persist in seeking the
death penalty because the evidence, in his determination, sup-
ports such action."' 52 The court reasoned:
If the national authority with responsibility for prosecuting the
offence takes such a firm stance, it is hardly open to the Court to
hold that there are no substantial grounds for believing that the
applicant faces a real risk of being sentenced to death and hence
experiencing the "death row phenomenon.' ' 3
Because the Court found that there was a real risk of the
exposure to the death sentence, it was necessry to determine if
the risk of exposure to "death row phenomenon" would make
extradition a breach of Article 3.
2. Does "Death Row Phenomenon" Breach Article Three ?
At the outset, the Court recognized that the death penalty
is a form of punishment which is accepted not only by various
legal systems but also by the Convention itself.' 5' Although the
I5o Id. at 39.
'5' Id. at 38.
However, the charge, being a State and not a federal offence, comes within the
jurisdiction of the Commonwealth of Virginia; it appears as a consequence that no
direction could or can be given to the Commonwealth's Attorney by any State or
Federal authority to promise more; the Virginia courts as judicial bodies cannot
bind themselves in advance as to what decisions they may arrive at on the evi-
dence; and the Governor of Virginia does not, as a matter of policy, promise that
he will later exercise his executive power to commute a death penalty.
Id.
12 Id. at 38-39.
11- Id. at 39.
"' The Convention, supra note 31, Article 2 § 1 provides that "[e]veryone's right to
life shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived of his life intentionally save in
the execution of a sentence of a court following his conviction of a crime for which this
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Convention provides for the death penalty, there must be a
standard by which to measure treatment or punishment pro-
scribed by Article 3.
The Court maintained that it was a well settled point in the
Court's case-law that ill-treatment and punishment must exist
at a minimum level of severity in order to fall within Article 3.155
The factors to be assessed in this determination include: (1) the
circumstances of the case, (2) the nature and context of the pun-
ishment or treatment, (3) the manner and method of executing
the punishment or treatment, (4) the duration of punishment or
treatment, and (5) the mental and/or physical effects of the
treatment.15 Age, sex and health of the victim may also be con-
sidered in some cases.
157
The Court referred to its ruling in Tryer's Case,158 wherein
it established the prerequisites for characterizing punishment or
treatment associated with punishment, as inhuman or degard-
ing. 159 The precedent set in Tryer's Case was the formulation
that the suffering from the humiliation involved must exceed
that inevitable element of suffering or humiliation connected
with a given form of legitimate punishment.160 The Court de-
cided that this included taking into account not only the physi-
cal pain inflicted, but also, "where there is a considerable delay
before execution of the punishment, of the sentenced person's
mental anguish of anticipating the violence he is to have in-
penalty is provided by law."
161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 39 (1989).
See, e.g., Ireland v. United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1978). In Ireland
v. United Kingdom, the Court was called upon to decide whether or not the Convention
precluded the systematic arrest, detention, interment and ill-treatment of Northern Irish
("terrorist") prisoners, was a violation of Article 3. The actions taken by the United
Kingdom were done under the authority of several legislative enactments. In Ireland v.
United Kingdom, the Court determined that hooding (putting a dark colored bag over
the detainee's head and keeping it there all the time except for interrogation), sleep, food
and drink deprivation, and subjection to cruel and unusual punishment.
.67 Tryer's Case, 26 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 65 (1978).
1"8 26 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1978). In this case, the Court determined that the
"caning" (spanking) of a 15 year-old schoolboy who pled guilty to assault and was pun-
ished in accordance with a corporal punishment statute, was degrading punishment
within the intendment of Article 3.
Id. at 14-15.
100 Id. at 14.
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flicted on him."' 1 Therefore, to render a decision in this case,
the Court required an examination of the specific circumstances
of the case, namely, the length of detention that Soering would
face prior to execution, the actual conditions in the detention
facility, and Soering's age and mental state.
A. Length of Detention Prior to Execution
The Court cited the length of time that "a prisoner can ex-
pect to spend on death row, on average six to eight years," ' 2 as
a significant factor in making its decision,1 63 recognizing that
these delays could be the prisoner's own making.' While the
Court lauded the "democratic character of the Virginia legal sys-
tem in general and the positive features of Virginia trial, sen-
tencing and appeal procedures,116 5 it ruled that these positive
features result in the "consequence .. . that the condemned
prisoner has to endure for many years the conditions on death
row and the anguish and mounting tension of living in the ever-
present shadow of death." ' This ruling was made despite the
Court's own analysis that "[t]he remedies available under Vir-
ginia law serve the purpose of ensuring that the ultimate sanc-
tion of death is not unlawfully or arbitrarily imposed. 11 67
The Court recognized that the length of time on death row
was substantially accounted for by collateral attacks on the
judgment brought by the prisoner in habeas corpus proceedings
before state and federal courts, as well as in applications for cer-
tiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States." These are
the collateral attacks that, in his Article 6 §3(c) allegation, Soer-
ing challenged as being not sufficiently available to him.'69 These
collateral attacks are not mandated, but, rather, a "part of
161 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 39 (1989).
1I2 Id. at 42.
163 Id.
1" "This length of time awaiting death is... largely of the prisoner's own making
in that he takes advantage of all avenues of appeal which are offered to him by Virginia
law." Id.
16I Id. at 44.
166 Id. at 42.
167 Id.
166 Id.
1ee See supra notes 55 and 73 and accompanying text.
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human nature that the person will cling to life by exploiting
those safeguards to the full."17
B. Conditions on Death Row
The Court ruled that "the severity of the special regime
such as that operated on death row in Mecklenburg is com-
pounded by the fact of inmates being subject to it for a pro-
tracted period lasting on average six to eight years. '171 In re-
viewing the conditions of the Mecklenburg Correctional Center,
the Court limited itself to "the facts which were uncontested by
the United Kingdom" stating that it did not consider the evi-
dence brought by Soering regarding the risk of homosexual
abuse and physical attack undergone by prisoners on death
row.
1 7 2
The specific conditions evaluated included the physical fa-
cilities,1 71 the daily routine,1 74 the services available to the in-
mates,175 and the process of preparing for execution. 7 It is sig-
nificant that, during this period of incarceration, the death row
inmates are allowed non-contact visits in a visiting room on
weekends and holidays, and access to their attorney during nor-
mal working hours, on request as well as during visiting hours.
Inmates with records of good behavior are allowed contact vis-
'" 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 42 (1989).
17, Id. at 42-43.
172 Id. at 42.
17- "A death row inmate's cell is 3m x 2.2m ... The death row area has two recrea-
tion yards, both of which are equipped with basketball courts and one of which is
equipped with weights and weight benches." Id. at 27.
"' Id. "[D]eath row inmates are given one hour out-of-cell time in the morning in
the common area. Each death row inmate is eligible for work assignment, such as clean-
ing duties." Id.
175 Id. "Death row inmates receive the same medical service as inmates in the gen-
eral population. An infirmary equipped with adequate supplies, equipment and staff pro-
vides for 24-hour in-patient care, and emergency facilities are provided in each building.
Mecklenburg also provides psychological and psychiatric services to death row inmates."
Id.
176 Id. at 28.
"A death row prisoner is moved to the death house 15 days before he is due to be
executed. The death house is next to the death chamber where the electric chair is
situated. While a prisoner is in the death house he is watched 24 hours a day. He
is isolated and has no light in his cell. The lights outside are permanently lit."
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its. 177 Additionally, all outgoing mail is picked up daily, and all
incoming mail is delivered each morning.178 The Court consid-
ered these conditions a stringent custodial regime, the cumula-
tive effect of which invokes Article 3.179 It is difficult to envision
any correctional facility responsible for the detention of death
row inmates which would be any different.
C. Soering's Age and Mental State
The final factor considered by the Court was Soering's age
and mental state at the time the murders were committed. The
Court noted that neither Virginia law nor the Convention pro-
hibited the imposition of a death sentence on a person less than
eighteen years old at the time of the crime. 180 It concluded, how-
ever, that subsequent international instruments, which explicitly
prohibit imposing the death penalty on persons under eighteen
years old, indicate "that as a general principle, the youth of the
person concerned is a circumstance which is liable, with others,
to put in question the compatibility with Article 3 of measures
connected with a death sentence." ' 8'
The Court concluded that "the applicant's youth at the
time of the offence and his then mental state, on the psychiatric
evidence as it stands, are therefore to be taken into considera-
tion as contributory factors tending, in his case, to bring the
treatment on death row within the terms of Article 3.' 182
VI. CONCLUSION
The decision of this Court will have long-standing repercus-
sions. The Court has precluded any fact finding by the Virginia
authorities and made its decision on speculation. While there
were no guarantees given to the United Kingdom as to the treat-
ment of Soering's case, none were required since the treaty183
between the United Kingdom and the United States only pro-
'7 Id. at 27-28.
178 Id. at 28.
'" Id. at 42-43.
Id. at 43.
181 Id.
182 Id.
"" The U.S.-U.K. Extradition Treaty, supra note 26.
[Vol. 4:157
28https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol4/iss1/7
SOERING'S CASE
vides for "assurance satisfactory to the requested party."'184 It is
uncontrovertible that the Court has no authority to assess the
character of the assurances given to the United Kingdom, which
has deemed them satisfactory. In effect, the Court has judged
unacceptable a course of practice between two Contracting
States to a treaty where the practice of the parties was entirely
within the scope of the treaty. The United Kingdom's view of
the assurances given by the United States was explained by the
Minister of State:
At the time of sentencing [the judge] will be informed that the
United Kingdom does not wish the death penalty to be imposed
or carried out. . . . It would be a fundamental blow to the extra-
dition agreements between our two countries if the death penalty
were carried out on an individual who had been returned under
those circumstances.185
This interference with a bilateral treaty might have been ac-
ceptable in a case where the Virginia courts had already found
the defendant guilty and had sentenced him to the death pen-
alty. At that point in time, there can be no speculation as to the
outcome of the trial or to the sentence to be imposed. In this
case, the defendant had not yet been tried. Therefore, it is
anomalous that the Court could uphold the dismissal of judicial
review of the Secretary of State's decision to sign the extradition
warrant on the grounds of untimeliness,186 yet decide the appli-
cability of the death row phenomenon where the applicant had
yet to be tried, let alone sentenced. For this reason, it appears
that any decision rendered on the effect of death row syndrome
on the applicant is speculation.
Even if the assurances given by the prosecutor were de facto
insufficient, there is little reason to justify the claim that there
was a real risk that Soering would face the death penalty.
184 Id. art. IV:
If the offence for which extradition is requested is punishable by death under the
relevant law of the requesting Party, but the relevant law of the requested Party
does not provide for the death penalty in a similar case, extradition may be re-
fused unless the requesting Party that the death penalty will not be carried out.
Id. (emphasis added).
18' For a more detailed explanation of the customary practice on this issue, see
supra, II. Procedural History and Jurisdictional Issues.
188 See supra notes 98-100 and accompanying text.
1992]
29
PACE Y.B. INT'L L.
Nothwithstanding the prosecutor's publicly announced intention
to seek the death penalty,"'7 the Virginia code provides strict
guidelines for its application and execution. 18 8 By finding that
Soering faced a real risk of receiving a death sentence, the Court
gave great weight to the prosecution's stated intention to seek
the death penalty, and virtually dismissed the litany of control-
ling case law and legislation in Virginia.
Equally troubling was the Court's conclusion that death row
conditions were sufficient to invoke Article 3. In effect, the Court
said that death row conditions are inhuman and degrading treat-
ment where the duration of stay is protracted. Thus, the ques-
tion arises as to what effect those conditions would have on the
prisoner who had been sentenced to life imprisonment without
parole. Having read the uncontroverted evidence as to the na-
ture of the facilities, the services available to inmates, and the
daily regime,/s one must wonder what conditions the Court
would consider acceptable for prisoners sentenced to death.
The undercurrent of this decision, taken in light of all the
facts presented, is that the Court is predisposed to find that the
death penalty is no longer an acceptable form of punishment,
despite its recognition by this Convention. The Court appears to
preclude extradition without a guarantee from the requesting
state to not impose the death penalty by determining that wait-
ing for execution of a death sentence triggers "death row phe-
nomenon," and by ruling that this creates an Article 3 violation.
What is Soering's fate? He can be extradited neither to the
United States, nor to the Federal Republic of Germany. The
Federal Republic of Germany government has not made out the
prima facie case against him required by the 1870 Extradition
Act, because it used an uncautioned confession.' 90 Finally, the
United Kingdom has no jurisdiction.' 9 ' The result has been to
defeat the purpose of extradition treaties. In the words of the
Court:
161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 14 (1989).
"s Va. Code Ann. §§ 19.2-264.2 et seq. (Michie 1990). See also supra notes 109-110
and accompanying text.
"8 See supra notes 173-76 and accompanying text.
"9 See supra notes 40-42 and accompanying text.
See supra, B. Jurisdictional Issues.
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As movement about the world becomes easier and crime takes on
a larger international dimension, it is increasingly in the interest
of all nations that suspected offenders who flee abroad should be
brought to justice. Conversely, the establishment of safe havens
for fugitives would not only result in danger for the State obliged
to harbor the protected person but also tend to undermine the
foundations of extradition. 192
It would appear that the Court has allowed. Soering to become a
protected person. The greatest harm, however, is that he has not
even been called to task for crimes he has admitted committing.
"1 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 35 (1989).
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